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Abstract 
We examine the announcement and post-acquisition share returns of 4,000 
acquisitions by UK public firms during 1984-1998. We include acquisitions of domestic 
and cross-border targets, and of both publicly quoted and privately held targets. In 
acquisitions of domestic public targets, abnormal returns are negative over both the 
announcement and post-acquisition period.  In acquisitions of cross-border public targets, 
abnormal returns are zero over the announcement period but negative over the post-
acquisition period.  In contrast, acquisitions of both domestic and cross-border private 
targets result in positive announcement returns and zero long run returns. The main 
difference between private and public acquisitions is that glamour acquirers experience 
negative announcement and long run returns in public acquisitions, whereas glamour 
acquirers do not underperform in private acquisitions. Furthermore, whereas the 
underperformance of domestic public acquisitions is limited to acquirers using noncash 
methods of payment, acquirers of domestic private targets that use noncash methods do 
not underperform. Overall, cross-border acquisitions result in lower announcement and 
long run returns than domestic acquisitions. In cross-border acquisitions involving high-
tech firms both announcement and long run returns are positive, whilst non-high-tech 
cross-border acquisitions experience zero announcement returns followed by negative 
long run performance. Our results also suggest that, in cross-border acquisitions, the 
national cultural difference between the bidder and target countries has a significantly 
negative impact on long run returns. 
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1. Introduction 
Compared to earlier merger waves, the waves of the 1980s and 1990s were distinct in terms of 
the amount of cross-border acquisition activity. On a global scale, cross-border acquisitions 
worldwide during 1986-2000 accounted for 26% of the value of total acquisitions. The global 
value of cross-border acquisitions rose steadily from about 0.5% of world wide GDP in the mid-
1980s to being over 2% in 2000. Clearly, cross-border acquisitions are more prevalent and bigger 
than ever before, and now account for over 80% of all foreign direct investment by industrialised 
countries (UNCTAD, 2000).  
Within this global trend, UK acquiring companies have played an increasingly important role. 
As shown in Figure 1, both the number and value of cross-border acquisitions by UK companies 
increased dramatically in the mid-1980s and 1990s, and were approximately equal to the number 
and value of domestic acquisitions over this period. The value of cross-border acquisitions carried 
out by UK companies accounts for an increasing proportion of all worldwide cross-border 
acquisitions. By 2000, the UK was the largest acquiring country worldwide, accounting for 31% 
of the total value of all cross-border acquisitions (UNCTAD, 2000).  
An important aspect of the UK acquisition activity abroad is the acquisition of privately held 
companies. Over the period 1985-98, 94% of the number of cross-border acquisitions was for 
privately held targets. In terms of total expenditure, 58% of the value of cross-border acquisitions 
was for privately held targets, reflecting the smaller size of private acquisitions. For domestic 
acquisitions, 88% of their number and 25% of their value are accounted for by acquisitions of 
privately held targets.1 Acquisitions of private targets therefore account for the vast majority of 
acquisitions made by UK companies in terms of number, and approximately half in terms of 
value. 
                                                           
1 Based on figures from Acquisitions Monthly, representing all acquisitions made by all UK companies 
(public and private), in which the transaction value is disclosed. This source reports that the vast majority in 
terms of both number (85%) and value (87%) of domestic and cross-border acquisitions by UK companies 
are carried out by publicly held companies.  
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Insert Figure 1 here 
Despite the scale of acquisitions involving cross-border targets and targets which are not 
publicly quoted, nearly all acquisition studies are limited to acquisitions of domestic targets 
which are publicly quoted.  These studies have typically found that acquiring shareholders earn 
neutral or negative returns over the short run announcement period.2 While these announcement 
period returns are important sources of information, the possibility exists that the market does not 
always accurately predict the future performance of acquisitions. Hence, an evaluation of the long 
run performance is also warranted. The long run post-acquisition studies have found mixed 
results with some finding negative returns, some studies finding zero returns.3  However, there are 
important theoretical reasons (discussed in the next section of the paper) why acquisitions of 
cross-border targets may differ from acquisitions of domestic targets, and why acquisitions of 
private targets will differ from acquisitions of public targets. It is therefore important to examine 
the performance of these different types of acquisitions. We do so by examining the 
announcement period and three-year post-acquisition performance of a sample of over 4,000 
acquisitions by UK public firms occurring during 1984-1998.  
The paper differs from previous long run merger studies in two important respects. Firstly, the 
study includes acquisitions of both domestic and cross-border targets, and acquisitions of both 
publicly quoted and privately held targets. No previous long run event study has examined all of 
these four different types of acquisition. This comprehensive sample allows each acquisition type 
to be directly contrasted with one another, and permits us to reach conclusions on the long run 
wealth effects of all acquisitions made by public acquirers. Secondly, this study utilises a long run 
methodology robust to most recent criticisms of commonly used long run methods (Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000), which although used in domestic acquisitions has not yet been employed in 
cross-border acquisitions. The calendar time methodology (Jaffe, 1974; and Mandelker, 1974) we 
                                                           
2 See Andrade et al. (2001), and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003). 
3 These studies are reviewed in Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), and Andrade et al. (2001). 
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employ explicitly accounts for statistical problems caused by the lack of independence among 
observations, arising from overlapping returns and the non-random timing of acquisitions (Lyon 
et al., 1999).  
There are several major findings of the study.  Acquisitions of private targets (domestic and 
cross-border) outperform acquisitions of public targets over both the announcement and three-
year post merger period.  Acquisition of domestic public targets result in significantly negative 
announcement returns of -0.99% and significantly negative returns in the three years after merger 
of -22%.    Acquisition of cross-border public targets result in zero announcement returns but 
significantly negative returns in the three post-acquisition years of -32%.    Acquisition of private 
targets, either domestically or internationally, result in significantly positive announcement 
returns and zero long run returns.  The long run findings are robust to alternative methods such as 
calendar time abnormal returns.  
We find that the main difference between private and public acquisitions is that glamour 
acquirers experience negative announcement and long run returns in public acquisitions, whereas 
there is no evidence of this in private acquisitions. Furthermore, whereas the underperformance of 
domestic public acquisitions is limited to acquirers using noncash methods of payment, acquirers 
of domestic private targets that use noncash methods do not underperform. In contrast, in cross-
border public acquisitions the method of payment has no significant influence on performance.  
One interpretation of this finding is that domestic acquirers offer overvalued securities, but that 
the increased due diligence and monitoring in cross-border mergers reduces the importance of 
method of payment.            
Overall, cross-border acquisitions result in lower announcement and long run returns than 
domestic acquisitions. In cross-border acquisitions involving high-tech firms both announcement 
and long run returns are positive, whilst non-high-tech cross-border acquisitions experience zero 
announcement returns followed by negative long run performance. Thus, the internalization 
theory of cross-border mergers is supported by our findings.  Our results also suggest that, in 
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cross-border acquisitions, the national cultural difference between the bidder and target countries 
has a significantly negative impact on long run returns. However, we fail to find support for some 
of the most common explanations for cross-border mergers, such as differences in legal systems, 
accounting standards, taxes, or exchange rates.   
The paper is organised as follows: The next section discusses the determinants of returns in 
acquisitions of cross-border targets and privately held targets. Section 3 reviews the existing 
empirical evidence.  Section 4 describes the data, sample characteristics, and methodology.  
Section 5 presents the returns for the entire sample. Section 6 investigates the determinants of 
announcement and post-acquisition returns.  The final section concludes. 
2. Hypotheses on acquisitions of cross-border and private targets  
(i) Information based assets and the returns from cross-border acquisitions 4 
One important argument for expecting the returns from cross-border acquisitions to be higher 
than those in domestic acquisitions is based on the gains from diversification when businesses 
seek synergies arising from intangible and especially information based assets (Baldwin and 
Caves, 1991; and Morck and Yeung, 2003). Examples of intangible information-based assets are 
brand names, specific assets in the form of technical knowledge, and R&D expenditure. In cross-
border mergers geographic diversification by direct investment in overseas subsidiaries permits 
firms to expand the boundary of the firm. This expansion permits the internalization of synergies 
                                                           
4 For a careful review of these and related effects in cross-border acquisitions, see Conn (2003). The 
general argument in relation to intangible and information based assets is crisply summarised in Baldwin 
and Caves (1991). Another set of arguments in cross-border acquisitions relate to factors affecting the rate 
or direction of overseas acquisitions over time or between countries as opposed to factors affecting the 
relative returns from domestic and overseas acquisitions given those factors. Examples of work in the 
former vein include Froot and Stein (1991) who argue that overseas acquisitions from a country will be 
higher when its exchange rate is strong because cross-border acquirers will then have a comparative 
advantage over local bidders, and Scholes and Wolfson (1990) who posit that tax law changes in the 1981 
Economic Recovery Act put foreign buyers in the US at a comparative disadvantage to domestic acquirers. 
This they argue was due to increased incentives for domestic mergers arising from more accelerated 
depreciation allowances and lower corporate tax rates. Similarly, the modification of some of the tax-
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based on intangible information based assets that would otherwise be lost because of various 
market failures. There are several kinds of market failure, which prevent arms length transactions 
from extracting the full synergistic value from the use of these assets (see e.g. Teece et al., 1997). 
Examples include difficulties in transmitting information and knowledge when it is tacit rather 
than codified, the ‘lemons problem’ when information asymmetry prevents a seller from 
obtaining the true value of the asset, and hold-up problems for one party to a deal where 
investments in specific assets are required to complement an input purchased from the other firm. 
An acquisition internalises these transactions and overcomes the market failure. Internalization, 
by geographical diversification, of transactions involving information-based assets thus permits 
the exploitation of economies of scale and scope in those assets. The tendency for cross-border 
acquisitions to be more prevalent in industries with high levels of R&D and technological inputs, 
and for multinational firms to earn higher than average rates of return is consistent with this 
interpretation of the gains from geographical diversification (Caves, 1986; Morck and Yeung, 
2003; and UNCTAD, 2000). 
(ii) Imperfect information, post-merger integration and the returns from cross-border 
acquisitions 
Whilst internalization theory provides an argument for expecting higher returns in cross-
border than domestic acquisitions, a number of factors point in the opposite direction. One group 
of reasons is based on the idea that overseas targets are more difficult to value accurately because 
of imperfect information. This type of argument is most frequently used in relation to acquisitions 
by UK and US firms of businesses in countries with less well-developed capital markets. This 
argument may also point to the prediction that the variance of returns should be higher in cross-
                                                                                                                                                                             
related benefits in the 1986 Tax Reform Act is argued to have reduced the competitive disadvantage of 
foreign buyers in the US We return to these argumen
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border deals.5 Another set of reasons for expecting relatively poor returns arises from difficulties 
of managing the post-merger process when cultural differences make integration and 
acculturation a difficult, time consuming and expensive process. The bigger the cultural gap and 
the bigger the relative size of the target the worse the problems may be. These problems clearly 
affect cross-border as opposed to domestic acquisitions.6 
(iii) Acquirer returns; the method of payment and the private/public company divide  
The theoretical and empirical literature on acquisition activity in general suggests that a 
number of characteristics of the bid may affect bidder returns. There is for instance evidence for 
positive impacts on acquirer performance for industry relatedness, hostility, and relative size 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Cosh and Guest, 2001; Fuller et al., 2002; and Megginson et al., 
2004). 
This literature is in general well-known and we do not rehearse it here except to note that if, 
for whatever reason, a sample of cross-border mergers differs from domestic mergers in these 
dimensions then performance differences may follow. It is necessary therefore to control for these 
effects when attempting to isolate public, private, domestic and international impacts.  Another 
strand of the acquisition literature has emphasised the impact upon acquirer returns of methods of 
payment and the public or private status of the target. Since we believe that this has particular 
implications for international acquisition behaviour it is worth discussing a little more fully here. 
                                                           
5 A different capital market thesis pointing to relatively high gains is advanced by La Porta et al. (2000). 
They argue that investor protection is highest in English common law countries, followed by the 
Scandinavian, Germanic and French civil law countries, and that efficient cross-border acquisitions will 
take place when an acquirer from a high investor protection country acquires a target from a low investor 
protection country. In a different vein, Moeller and Schlingemann (2002) argue that acquisition 
performance may be lower in more restrictive institutional environments, because of greater asymmetric 
information.  
6 Evidence from the human resource, organisational behaviour and strategic management disciplines as 
well as practitioner surveys suggest that national culture is an important determinant of success in cross-
border acquisitions (Baldwin and Caves, 1991; Schoenberg, 2000; and UNCTAD, 1999). An excellent 
overview of this literature and an empirical application to inward takeovers in the UK is Child et al. (2001).  
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Bids for private firms are, as we have seen, a major component of both domestic and overseas 
acquisition activity. There are arguments for believing that bids for such firms may lead to bidder 
returns that exceed those obtained in bids for public firms. The first argument is that the process 
of making private bids is less exposed to public gaze. Bidders can end negotiations without the 
loss of face that may occur in a public bid, especially if the public bid is hostile. Poor acquisition 
outcomes due to hubris are therefore less likely in private bids. Secondly in a private bid, if the 
payment is in shares, and if the target is relatively large compared to the bidder, then since the 
target management are typically majority shareholders in private firms they can end up as 
significant blockholders in the post merger firm. They may then play a monitoring role in 
ensuring that post merger activities are in the stockholders interests generally. Equally, they have 
a greater incentive to exercise due diligence prior to the bid. Thirdly, the private nature of the 
transaction may lead to the disclosure of information between the parties which would be 
impossible in a public bid where, frequently, takeover codes and listing rules require equal and 
public information disclosure to all shareholders. Finally, the illiquid nature of the market in the 
closely-held stock of private firms may make less likely the emergence of competing bids. The 
payments of the significant premia which characterise contested public acquisitions are therefore 
less likely and bidder returns are more likely to be positive as a result of this ‘discount’.7 
There are a number of reasons for expecting the method of payment to vary in cross-border 
compared to domestic bids and especially in private compared to public bids. The usual argument 
for method of payment effects is that cash bids do better for bidder shareholders because the 
market takes this as a positive signal of bidder expectations of future returns.8 This argument may 
                                                           
7 Fuller et al. (2002), Ang and Kohers (2001), Moeller and Schlingemann (2002), and Moeller et al. 
(2004), provide useful overviews of these arguments. The empirical evidence on the existence of a private 
sector discount is mixed. Koeplin et al. (2000) find that private companies sell for a significant discount 
compared to public companies. Ang and Kohers (2001) on the other hand, find that private targets sell for a 
significantly higher premium than public targets.  
8 See for example Loughran and Vijh (1997). There are two alternative explanations for the positive 
impact of cash bids. One is the signalling argument that acquirers offer securities when they are overvalued 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984). The other explanation is that acquirers offer securities when they have a low 
valuation of the target (Fishman, 1989). 
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not have the same force in the case of cross-border bids, because other factors will also influence 
the means of payment. For example, the use of equity by cross-border acquirers may be due to the 
greater uncertainty connected with the information problems associated with acquiring abroad. 
This may be especially true for private overseas deals where the information may be even more 
imperfect. If bidder shareholders recognise this reasoning then the usual positive impact of cash 
bids compared to equity bids may be nullified. Equally, cash bids may be forced by the reluctance 
on the part of cross-border target shareholders to accept foreign equity (Gaughan, 2002).  In this 
case too the signalling impact of the use of cash may be neutralised. This neutralising effect may 
be present too in the case of private bids generally if the over-riding objective of target owner 
managers is to “cash out” rather than stay on as stakeholders in the newly enlarged firm. The 
positive impact of cash on returns may therefore be less apparent in bids for overseas public firms 
than in bids for domestic public firms and less apparent in bids for private than for public 
companies generally. 
3. Previous research on returns to shareholders of bidding firms  
(i) Empirical evidence on bidder returns: acquisitions of cross-border targets 
There is extensive empirical evidence on the short run announcement period returns to 
acquiring company shareholders in cross-border acquisitions of publicly quoted targets. Conn 
(2003) reports that of the 15 studies he reviews, the primary conclusion is the dominance of zero 
or negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for acquiring firms (both US and UK). These 
findings closely parallel those observed in domestic acquisitions of public targets for both the US 
(Andrade et al., 2001) and the UK (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003).    
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There is limited empirical evidence on long horizon share returns in cross-border 
acquisitions.9, 10, 11 Table 1 summarises the results of the six long run studies to date for both US 
and UK acquirers. A drawback with four of the studies (Conn and Connell, 1990; Danbolt, 1995; 
Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; and Aw and Chatterjee, 2004) is their use of the market model 
methodology, the weaknesses of which are now well documented. Market models suffer from 
parameter instability (Coutts et al., 1997), are inferior to multi index models (Fama and French, 
1992), and are subject to statistical biases which have led to more reliable test statistics being 
employed than those employed in these studies (Lyon et al., 1999). However, the two studies by 
Black et al. (2003) and by Gregory and McCorriston (2004) do address some of these 
methodological concerns. 
Insert Table 1 here 
The four studies by Conn and Connell (1990), Danbolt (1995), Black et al. (2003), and Aw 
and Chatterjee (2004), examine cross-border acquisitions of publicly quoted targets. Despite the 
variation in methodology and sample, all four studies report significantly negative post-
acquisition returns. Aw and Chatterjee (2004) directly compare cross-border with domestic 
acquisitions, and find that in cross-border acquisitions returns are lower although not significantly 
so. The studies by Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and by Gregory and McCorriston (2004) examine 
cross-border acquisitions of both publicly and privately held targets. In contrast to the other cross-
border long run studies, neither study finds evidence of significantly negative long run returns. 
Neither study reports returns separately for public and private acquisitions.  
                                                           
9 In terms of profitability effects, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) find a significantly negative impact of 
cross-border acquisitions on earnings, but not domestic acquisitions. Similarly, Moeller and Schlingemann 
(2002) find a significantly lower change in operating performance for cross-border acquisitions compared 
to domestic acquisitions.  
10 There is a large literature examining the impact of multinationality on firm value, the results for which 
are mixed. For example, Denis et al. (2002) find a negative impact, whilst Bodnar et al. (1997) find a 
positive impact.  
11 A recent practitioner survey found that shareholder value decreased in 53% of 700 cross-border 
acquisitions completed during 1996-98 (Kelly et al., 1999). 
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The tentative overall conclusions one draws from these six studies is that cross-border 
acquisitions of all public and private targets do not result in significantly negative long run 
returns, whereas cross-border acquisitions of targets which are publicly quoted do result in 
significantly negative long run returns. 
(ii) Empirical evidence on bidder returns: acquisitions of private targets  
There is very little evidence on either the short or long run returns to public acquirers that 
acquire privately held targets. Chang (1998) finds no significant announcement period returns for 
bidders that acquire private targets with cash, whilst bidders that use stock have a significantly 
positive return. In contrast, bidders that acquire public targets with stock have a significantly 
negative return. Hansen and Lott (1996) find that bidders experience a two percent higher return 
when purchasing a private firm compared to a public firm. Similarly, Fuller et al. (2002) find that 
bidder shareholders gain when buying a private firm or subsidiary but lose when purchasing a 
public firm. Moeller et al. (2004) report positive abnormal announcement returns for acquisitions 
of subsidiaries and independent private firms and negative returns for public targets. Therefore, 
the short run evidence suggests generally higher returns for US buyers in domestic purchases of 
privately held targets than for purchases of publicly held targets.  
Two recent US studies examine the effects of private acquisitions on the acquirers’ long run 
stock performance. Both Ang and Kohers (2001) and Moeller et al. (2004) use the Fama-French 
three-factor model, and find no evidence of abnormal returns in the three-year post acquisition 
period. The same result holds for subsamples of cash offer bids and stock offer bids.12  
                                                           
12 In terms of operating performance, Moeller and Schlingemann (2002) find a positive but insignificant 
effect of private acquisitions compared to public acquisitions.  
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4. Data, sample statistics and methodology 
(i) Data 
We examine a sample of acquisitions of domestic public, domestic private, cross-border 
public, and cross-border private target companies by UK public companies, completed between 
January 1, 1984 and December 31, 1998. The sample acquisitions are drawn from the Thomson 
Financial SDC Mergers Database and the Thomson Financial magazine Acquisitions Monthly.13 
Acquisitions are defined as occurring when the bidder owns less than 50% of the target’s voting 
shares before the takeover, and increases its ownership to at least 50% as a result of the takeover. 
We exclude acquisitions if the UK bidder is not a publicly traded firm with its share price data 
held on the Datastream Database. Many acquisitions involve relatively small targets that may not 
be expected to have a material effect on the acquirer. We therefore adopt a materiality constraint 
that limits our sample to acquisitions in which the target’s acquisition value is at least 5% of the 
acquiring firm’s market value in the acquisition month.  We exclude acquisitions for which the 
acquisition value was not reported. Our final sample of 4,344 acquisitions consists of 131 
acquisitions of cross-border public targets, 1,009 acquisitions of cross-border private targets, 576 
acquisitions of domestic public targets, and 2,628 acquisitions of domestic private targets.  
(ii) Sample statistics 
Table 2 highlights salient features of the samples according to whether the target is a domestic 
or cross-border company, and a public or private company. Firstly, consistent with the aggregate 
figures above, private targets are more numerous than public targets but also much smaller in 
both absolute and relative values compared to bidders. Secondly, two thirds of the sample 
                                                           
13 Of our sample of 4,344 acquisitions, 2,538 are drawn from Acquisitions Monthly, whilst 3,989 are 
drawn from SDC, with an overlap between the two databases of 2,182 acquisitions. The Acquisitions 
Monthly data does not suffer from survivorship bias because it is hand collected from a monthly magazine 
that is published at the end of the announcement month. Similarly, the SDC data includes acquisitions by 
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acquirers engaged in multiple acquisitions during the sample period 1984-1998, with an average 
number of five acquisitions.  Multiple acquisitions raise the problem of dependent observations 
due to overlapping observations, and we return to this issue below.  Third, cash is the primary 
medium of payment in cross-border acquisitions and in private acquisitions. The most prevalent 
use of stock is found in domestic acquisitions of public targets.  Fourth, the proportion of hostile 
acquisitions is about 10% for cross-border acquisitions of public targets and 13% for domestic 
deals with public firms.  Thus, friendly acquisitions dominate our samples.  Fifth, acquisitions 
between firms in related industries (defined as the same 2-digit SIC code) occur in 45% of the 
cross-border sample and 39% of the domestic sample, although the proportions are significantly 
higher in acquisitions of private targets compared to public targets.  Sixth, acquisitions involving 
high-tech firms as either the target or bidder are significantly more common in cross-border 
acquisitions.14 This is consistent with the internalization theory for cross-border acquisitions and 
is consistent with Harris and Ravenscraft (1991). Finally, the major targets of cross-border 
acquisitions are in North America (53%) and Europe (40%).   Thus, UK acquirers have a clear 
preference for targets in industrialised countries and English speaking countries. 
Insert Table 2 here 
(iii) Methodology 
(a) Announcement period returns 
We follow Brown and Warner’s (1985) standard event study methodology to calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the 3-day period (-1, 1) around the announcement date. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
acquirers that subsequently die. We are confident therefore, that our sample of acquirers does not suffer 
from survivorship bias. 
14 Butchart (1987) defines UK industries as high-tech if the R&D expenditure to industry output is 
substantially above average. If this ratio is above - but not substantially above - average, a second measure 
is employed based on the proportion of scientists, professional engineers and technicians in the labour 
force. The following UK SIC 2-digit industries are subsequently classified as high-tech: Chemicals (SIC 
24), Plastics (SIC 25), Machinery and Equipment (SIC 29), Office Machines and Computers (SIC 30), 
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The abnormal returns are estimated using the market-adjusted model, where the benchmark return 
is the contemporaneous return on the Datastream equal weighted market index. The t-statistics are 
estimated using the cross-sectional variation of abnormal returns. We do not estimate market 
parameters based on a time period before each bid since our sample acquirers make frequent 
acquisitions and there is a high probability that previous takeover attempts would be included in 
the estimation period thus making beta estimations less meaningful. Additionally, it has been 
shown that for short-window event studies weighting the market return by the firm’s beta does 
not significantly improve estimation (Brown and Warner, 1980). 
The three-day window is one of the two most commonly used event windows for merger 
studies (Andrade et al., 2001). The other window most commonly used starts before the 
announcement and ends with the completion of the merger.15 The longer window makes it 
possible to take into account bid revisions and competition. The advantage of the shorter window 
used here is that its results are typically insensitive to the model chosen for expected returns.16 
(b) Post-bid period returns 
The selection of a proper benchmark is always problematic when examining long run returns. 
Lyon et al. (1999) show that differences in the properties of sample and population distributions 
can create biases and ambiguities in test statistics. Table 2 shows that acquirers tend to be 
distributed in the higher size and market-to-book ratio quintiles. Our counterfactual approach 
therefore measures acquirer performance relative to non-acquiring control firms matched on size 
and market-to-book ratio. The control firms are selected by first dividing all UK stocks listed on 
Datastream into ten equal sized portfolios based on their market values at the beginning of each 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Electrical Equipment (SIC 31), Electronics (SIC 32), Medical Instruments and Control Equipment (SIC 
33), Telecommunications and Post (SIC 64) Software (SIC 72), and R&D (SIC 73).  
15 For our sample, the average length of time between the announcement date and the completion date is 
14 days. 
16  We also calculate abnormal returns over the entire announcement month using a size/market-to-book 
control firm benchmark (as described in the next section). Our results are not sensitive to either definition 
of abnormal returns. 
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calendar year. Those control firms that carried out a sample acquisition within the preceding or 
subsequent five years are then excluded from the matching universe. Each sample firm is then 
matched with the non-merging firm from its size portfolio that has the closest market-to-book 
ratio at the beginning of the calendar year. This procedure is repeated for each post-takeover 
calendar year using a fresh grouping by size decile for the year in question.17  The control firm 
approach avoids the skewness and rebalancing biases inherent in a reference portfolio. The 
skewness bias arises if the distribution of long run abnormal stock returns is positively skewed.18 
The rebalancing bias arises because the compound returns of a reference portfolio, such as an 
equally weighted market index, are typically calculated assuming periodic rebalancing.19  
We adopt two approaches to measure long run abnormal stock-price performance. First, we 
follow the approach of Barber and Lyon (1997) and estimate buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs), beginning the month following completion through the end of the 36-month period 
following the completion month, or until the sample firm is delisted. As pointed out by Fama 
(1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000), estimating statistical significance with this methodology 
is problematic because standard t-statistics do not adequately account for potential cross-sectional 
dependence in returns. In particular, standard errors will be biased downwards and t-statistics will 
be biased upwards. This is a real problem for our sample because only a small number (502) of 
our sample acquisitions are carried out by single acquirers, and the remaining 3,842 sample 
acquisitions are accounted for by 974 acquirers, an average of five per acquirer. The time between 
acquisitions for multiple acquirers is on average 14 months meaning that many acquisitions will 
overlap with another acquisition by the same acquirer. To address this problem, we firstly 
calculate t-statistics which are adjusted for cross-sectional dependence using an identical method 
                                                           
17 If a control firm dies within the year, we replace the returns from the month of exit with the returns of 
the next nearest firm in terms of market-to-book ratio within the particular size decile at the beginning of 
the year in which the exit took place. If this control firm dies then we use the next closest firm, and so on.  
18 Examination of the distribution of abnormal returns revealed no evidence of skewness (skewness 
statistic -0.47), and therefore no need for skewness adjusted t-tests.  
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to Mitchell and Stafford (2000).20 The advantage of this method is that it allows us to attach 
statistical significance to buy-and-hold returns, which are an accurate representation of investor 
experience.  
The alternative approach follows Fama (1998) and Lyon et al.  (1999), who recommend using 
the Jaffe (1974) - Mandelker (1974) calendar time portfolio technique to overcome cross-
sectional dependence. In each calendar month we form a portfolio of event firms, and take the 
average cross-sectional abnormal return for that month. The average abnormal return for the 
entire sample is the time series average (CTAR) and the t-test is calculated using the standard 
deviation of the time series.21 This t-test is shown by Lyon et al. (1999) as not biased in the 
presence of overlapping returns. 
5. The stock returns for our sample  
(i) Announcement returns 
We begin our results by examining acquirer announcement returns as measured by the CAR 
over the announcement period, as reported in Table 3.  Both domestic and cross-border 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 However, our approach is susceptible to the new listing bias, which arises because some of our control 
firms may have begun trading subsequent to the announcement month. Generally, the new listing bias 
creates a positive bias, because newly listed firms tend to underperform. 
20 The t-statistics are adjusted using the following approximation for the standard deviation:  
                              σBHAR (independence) / σBHAR (dependence) ≈ 1 / √ 1 + (N -1) ρ i,j                              (1) 
where σBHAR = standard deviation of individual BHARs, N = number of sample events and ρi,j = average 
correlation of individual BHARs. To estimate ρi,j, we firstly calculate average pairwise correlations of 
annual BHARs for all acquirers that complete acquisitions in the same month, and thus have 36 months of 
calendar time overlap. The grand average of these average pairwise correlations is 0.008. We then assume 
that the average correlation for overlapping observations is linear in the number of months of calendar time 
overlap, ranging from zero for non-overlapping observations to the estimated average correlation of 0.008 
for acquirers with complete overlap. This gives a ρi,j of 0.002. To the extent that average correlations are 
increasing in the holding period, the correlation of three-year BHARs will be higher than the annual 
correlations calculated here, and therefore the standard errors are still likely to be understated (Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000).  
21 Our announcement and post-acquisition return measures reveal the short term reaction to takeover and 
any long term market revisions, but do not precisely measure the overall performance (announcement plus 
post-acquisition returns) and its significance. In order to estimate overall performance we estimate the 
calendar time approach including the abnormal return for the announcement month as well as the 36 post-
acquisition months. These overall calander time returns are very similar to the post-acquisition returns 
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acquisitions result in significantly positive returns of 0.68% and 0.33%, respectively.  However, 
the positive returns are driven by mergers with private targets rather than public targets.  In 
domestic mergers the returns for acquiring public firms are a significantly negative -0.99%, whilst 
the returns for acquiring cross-border public targets are an insignificant -0.09%. In contrast, the 
returns for private targets are significantly positive.  Acquisitions of private firms result in 
significantly positive returns of 0.38% in cross-border acquisitions and 1.05% in domestic 
acquisitions. For all public acquisitions, returns are a significantly negative -0.82%, compared to 
a significantly positive 0.86% in all private acquisitions.    
The significantly negative returns to acquirers in domestic acquisitions of public targets are 
consistent with previous studies (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). The insignificant negative 
returns in cross-border public acquisitions are not surprising given the mixed findings in previous 
studies (Conn, 2003). However, the finding of significantly positive gains in domestic private 
acquisitions is consistent with previous evidence for the US (Hansen and Lott, 1996; and Fuller et 
al., 2002). This is the first evidence that returns in cross-border acquisitions are positive for 
private targets and zero for public targets.    
Insert Table 3 here 
(ii) Post-acquisition stock returns 
(a) Buy-and-hold returns 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the buy-and-hold abnormal returns for the 36 months following the 
completion of the acquisition. We observe a clear difference in returns between public 
acquisitions and private acquisitions, in both the cross-border and domestic samples. Domestic 
acquisitions of public targets result in significantly negative returns of -19.78%. Cross-border 
acquisitions of public targets result in returns of -32.33%. The return for acquisitions of all 
                                                                                                                                                                             
reported, and therefore our main conclusions on post-acquisition performance can be interpreted as 
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publicly quoted targets is a significantly negative -22.11%. In contrast, there is no evidence of 
significantly negative returns in acquisitions of private targets. Domestic acquisitions of private 
targets result in insignificant negative returns of -4.78%, whilst cross-border acquisitions of 
private targets result in insignificant negative returns of -10.91%. The return for all cross-border 
and domestic acquisitions of private targets is an insignificant -6.48%. For all cross-border 
acquisitions the return is -13.37%, which is significant at the 10% level. For all domestic 
acquisitions the return is an insignificantly negative -7.47%, and for all acquisitions it is an 
insignificantly negative -9.02%.  
Insert Table 4 here 
For our event time returns, we have used BHARs as recommended by Lyon et al. (1999). 
However, Fama (1998), who favours CARs, notes that BHARs grow with the return horizon even 
if there is no abnormal return after the first period. We therefore recalculated the tests in Panel A 
of Table 4, using CARs instead of BHARs but found no significant differences between the two 
techniques.22  
(b) Calendar time returns 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the monthly CTARs for the 36 months following the completion of 
the acquisition. Domestic acquisitions of public targets result in significantly negative returns of -
0.40%, indicating that these acquirers exhibit average abnormal returns of -0.40% per month over 
the 36-month period following the acquisition. Cross-border acquisitions of public targets result 
in significantly negative returns of -0.71%. The return for acquisitions of all publicly quoted 
targets is a significantly negative -0.42%. This translates to a compounded three year return of 
approximately -14.06%, which is somewhat lower than the BHAR of -22.11% reported in Panel 
A.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
representing overall performance as well. 
22 The results are available from the authors on request. 
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Cross-border acquisitions of private targets result in insignificant negative returns of -0.19%, 
whilst domestic acquisitions of private targets result in insignificant negative returns of -0.08%. 
The return for all acquisitions of private targets is -0.14%. This translates to a three-year return of 
approximately -4.92%, which is close to the negative BHAR of -6.48% reported in Panel A. For 
all cross-border acquisitions, the return is an insignificantly negative -0.27%. For the domestic 
acquisitions, the return is an insignificantly negative -0.19%. The CTAR results are therefore 
quite similar to the BHARs, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.  
Loughran and Ritter (2000) suggest that CTARs lack power because they weight each month 
equally regardless of the number of observations in that month, and are therefore inferior to 
BHARs. To check the robustness of our results, we recalculated the CTARs by weighting each 
calendar month by the number of observations in that month, but found no significant differences 
in our findings.23, 24 
We have identified several patterns in the long run returns which are robust to using either 
buy-and-hold or calendar time returns, and are consistent with the empirical long run studies 
reviewed in Section 3. Firstly, acquisitions of domestic public and cross-border public companies 
both exhibit significantly negative returns. Secondly, acquisitions of domestic private companies 
and cross-border private companies, both exhibit insignificant returns.  Thirdly, acquisitions of all 
domestic companies, which include both public and private targets, exhibit insignificant returns. 
Fourthly, returns in cross-border acquisitions are slightly lower than in domestic acquisitions. For 
the sample of all cross-border acquisitions, weak evidence of negative returns is shown using the 
buy-and-hold t-statistic but not the calendar time t-statistic. We consider the latter to be the more 
reliable methodology because of the difficulty in estimating the true correlation of three-year 
                                                           
23 The results are available from the authors on request. 
24 Our results are unchanged when we use only one acquisition per firm per calendar month in each 
category of acquisition. 
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BHARs, and hence the true standard errors. Consequently, in Section 6 below, which investigates 
the determinants of long run returns, we report results based on calendar time abnormal returns.25 
6. The determinants of acquisition returns   
In this section, we move from the measurement of average outcomes to examine the 
determinants of announcement and long run returns. The purpose of this part of the paper is to 
examine whether the differences we have found between domestic and cross-border, and between 
public and private acquisitions, are still found when we take account of other factors which are 
known to influence merger outcomes. In Section 6(i) we employ univariate analysis and in 
Section 6(ii) we employ regression analysis. 
(i) Univariate analysis 
(a) Returns by method of payment and relative size 
Table 5 reports the returns to acquirers classified by type of target, method of payment and 
relative size. This is important in view of our finding, shown in Table 2, that cross-border 
acquisitions are dominated by cash, and that within domestic acquisitions, private targets are far 
more likely to be acquired by cash. Table 5 allows us to distinguish the domestic/cross-border and 
the public/private from the cash/noncash effects. Acquisitions are categorised according to 
whether the acquisition is made with an all cash offer, or any other offer. Noncash offers include 
stock offers, stock and cash offers, and other offers.  
The impact of the method of payment is examined for announcement returns in Panel A of 
Table 5. The announcement abnormal returns reveal that in nearly all cases, cash deals are worse 
than noncash deals. The exception is domestic public acquisitions, for which the insignificant 
positive announcement returns associated with cash acquisitions exceed the significantly negative 
                                                           
25 We carried out the analysis in Section 6 using buy-and-hold returns instead of calendar time returns. 
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noncash acquisitions. In every category of payment method, public targets give lower 
announcement returns than private acquisitions. 
Panel B reports the calendar time returns for the post-bid 36 months. In acquisitions of public 
targets financed by cash, returns are an insignificant 0.06%. In contrast, if such acquisitions are 
financed by noncash, returns are a significantly negative -0.47%. In acquisitions of private 
targets, returns are small and insignificant regardless of whether the payment is cash (-0.14%) or 
noncash (-0.07%). Therefore, we find the main difference between the long run performance of 
domestic private and public acquisitions is the worst performance of public targets in domestic 
noncash acquisitions. 
In assessing the returns for cross-border acquisitions, we should recall that Table 2 showed 
80% of cross-border acquisitions of public targets to be cash financed. These acquisitions result in 
large negative returns of -0.59%, significant at the 10% level. The very small sample of 26 
noncash public acquisitions exhibit negative although insignificant returns of -0.51%. In 
acquisitions of private targets, returns are insignificantly negative for both cash (-0.19%) and 
noncash (-0.32%).  
Insert Table 5 here 
Our results show that acquisitions of domestic public targets financed by noncash methods 
result in significantly negative long run returns, whereas those financed by cash do not, consistent 
with previous studies (Loughran and Vijh, 1997). In contrast, in cross-border acquisitions of 
public targets, we find weak evidence of negative returns in both cash and noncash financed 
deals. In line with these findings, Black et al. (2003), report that cross-border public acquisitions 
underperform, regardless of whether cash or stock is used. Since shareholders of foreign 
companies may be reluctant to receive securities as the method of payment, one possibility is that 
overvalued acquirers or acquirers with a low value of the target are forced to offer cash instead of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
This made no material difference to our results or our conclusions. 
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securities.  In contrast to public acquisitions, we find no evidence that acquisitions of private 
targets which are financed by noncash experience negative returns.  
One explanation for the latter finding is the theory that private acquisitions perform well 
because target shareholders become effective monitors in the acquirer. This theory implies that 
returns in noncash acquisitions should be increasing in the relative size of the target (Fuller et al., 
2002). We define relative size by the ratio of the value of the deal to the market value of the 
acquirer. We find consistent support for this hypothesis only for private targets. Amongst most 
other groups, targets of a larger relative size have a worse impact on both announcement and long 
run returns. This is generally the case for cash offers, but is also found for noncash, public 
offers.26 The findings are not reported in detail here, but are explored in Section 6(ii). We 
therefore find little evidence to suggest that improved monitoring can explain the difference 
between public and private acquisitions financed by noncash methods. We suggest instead that 
the problem of overvaluation may be mitigated in private acquisitions because the bidder can 
disclose private information to target shareholders, or because target shareholders have a greater 
incentive to assess the acquirer’s prospects carefully.  
(b) Long run returns by the acquirers’ value and glamour status 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) show that long run 
underperformance in acquisitions of public targets is predominantly caused by glamour acquirers 
with high market-to-book ratios, and that positive long run returns are associated with value 
acquirers with low market-to-book ratios. Table 6 reports the abnormal announcement returns and 
the long run calendar time returns by target type and the acquirer’s market-to-book quintile at the 
beginning of the year of acquisition. Acquirers are classified as value if their market-to-book ratio 
                                                           
26 Since larger monitors are more likely to be created when stock (rather than all noncash offers) is used, 
we examined the impact of relative size on stock acquisitions only.  Our results were materially unchanged 
by this alternative classification.  
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quintile is quintile one (lowest), neutral if quintiles two-four, and glamour if quintile five 
(highest).  
The announcement returns are shown in Panel A of Table 6.  Our finding that announcement 
returns for private targets are larger on average than those for public targets is supported 
conclusively for both domestic and cross-border bids, since in each category returns to private 
targets are greater. In domestic acquisitions, public and private glamour acquirers do worst. The 
picture is more mixed for cross-border acquisitions where value acquirers appear to be the least 
successful acquirers on average. We now turn to whether these findings are supported in the long 
run. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the long run post-bid returns. In domestic acquisitions of public 
targets, glamour acquirers earn significantly negative returns of -0.84%. This is a continuation of 
the negative announcement returns and these returns are much lower than the insignificant 
negative returns of -0.31% experienced by neutral acquirers of public targets, and somewhat 
lower than the insignificantly negative returns of -0.60% experienced by value acquirers of public 
targets. The returns by value, neutral and glamour in acquisitions of private targets are very 
different. Each of these showed significant positive announcement abnormal returns. In terms of 
long run returns, glamour acquirers of private targets earn insignificantly positive returns of 
0.14%. Neutral acquirers earn returns that are not significantly different from zero. However, 
value acquirers earn significantly negative returns of -0.74%. 
In the long run, glamour acquirers of cross-border public targets earn significantly negative 
returns of -1.48%. In contrast, the returns in acquisitions of cross-border public targets by value 
and neutral acquirers are insignificantly positive, being 0.62% and 0.15% respectively. Therefore, 
the market’s initial assessment of glamour bidders for public targets appears to be far more 
realistic in the case of domestic acquisitions than its overly optimistic assessment of their cross-
border counterparts. In cross-border acquisitions of private targets, returns for glamour acquirers 
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are an insignificantly positive 0.29%. Neutral acquirers earn insignificant returns of -0.04%. 
Value acquirers earn significantly negative returns of -1.31%.  
Insert Table 6 here 
We therefore find that glamour acquirers experience long run negative returns in public 
acquisitions, but no evidence of this in private acquisitions where instead value acquirers 
experience negative long run returns. The former finding is consistent with that of Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), whose explanation is that glamour 
acquirers suffer from hubris and consequently overpay for their targets.27 It has also been argued 
(Ang and Kohers, 2001) that hubris is much more likely to surface in public acquisitions 
compared to private acquisitions because of the much higher level of publicity involved. 
However, if we combine these predictions that hubris is more likely in glamour acquirers and 
public acquisitions, we would expect to see glamour private acquirers performing worse than 
value private acquirers, and that is not what we see. Therefore, our evidence overall is 
inconsistent with these explanations. 
(c)  Long run returns by the high-tech status of the acquirer and target 
To test the internalization theory of cross-border acquisitions, we relate returns in cross-border 
acquisitions to the technological know-how of both the acquirer and target industries. We 
categorise industries as high-tech using the classification of Butchart (1987), and compare returns 
for acquisitions in which bidder and target industries are both high-tech with acquisitions in 
which bidder and target industries are not both high-tech. For comparison purposes, we also 
examine domestic acquisitions. Table 7 reports both announcement and post-bid calendar time 
returns by target type and the high-tech status of the acquisition. 
                                                           
27 We test whether the negative long-run glamour effect is driven by the method of payment, but find no 
evidence of this. For domestic public glamour noncash acquisitions, the mean CTAR is -0.78% whilst for 
domestic public glamour cash acquisitions, the CTAR is -1.31%. For cross-border public glamour non-cash 
acquisitions, the CTAR is 0.20% whilst for cross-border public glamour cash acquisitions, the CTAR is -
2.97%. 
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The announcement returns show that in cross-border acquisitions the mean announcement 
returns for high-tech private acquisitions are significantly large and positive, whilst all other 
cross-border acquirers have insignificant announcement returns. For all cross-border acquisitions, 
high-tech acquisitions result in significant returns of 0.90% compared to 0.07% in all non-high-
tech cross-border deals. In contrast, in domestic acquisitions, the announcement returns are very 
similar for both high-tech and non-high-tech acquisitions. 
Panel B of Table 7 reports on post-bid, 36-month calendar time returns. In domestic public 
acquisitions involving high-tech firms, returns are a significantly negative -1.45%. When both 
firms are not high-tech, returns are an insignificantly negative -0.31%. In domestic private 
acquisitions, returns are an insignificant -0.21% in high-tech acquisitions, and an insignificant 
0.01% in non-high-tech acquisitions. The return in all domestic acquisitions when both firms are 
high-tech is an insignificant -0.43%, compared to an insignificant -0.15% when both firms are not 
high-tech. Overall therefore, in the long run we continue to find little difference between high-
tech and non-high-tech acquisitions when the target is domestic. 
We found that announcement returns for cross-border private high-tech acquisitions were 
significant and positive. Panel B shows that over the long run, this type of acquisition also results 
in significantly positive returns of 0.82%, whilst non-high-tech acquisitions result in significantly 
negative returns of -0.44%. In all cross-border acquisitions involving high-tech firms, returns are 
a positive 0.64%, significant at the 10% level. In contrast, all cross-border acquisitions that do not 
involve both high-tech firms, result in significantly negative returns of -0.52%.  
Insert Table 7 here 
We check whether long run returns are higher in cross-border acquisitions if either (rather than 
both) the acquirer or the target are high-tech companies. The results (not tabulated) show no 
evidence of this. Acquisitions by high-tech acquirers of non-high-tech targets result in returns of -
0.68%, significant at the 10% level. Acquisitions by non-high-tech acquirers of high-tech targets 
earn insignificantly negative returns of -0.41%. All cross-border acquisitions by high-tech 
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acquirers result in insignificant returns of 0.10% compared to a significantly negative -0.45% for 
non-high-tech acquirers. 
The cross-border high-tech acquisitions involve a higher percentage of related acquisitions 
(58%) than the cross-border non-high-tech acquisitions (41%). However, this difference is not 
driving our results. The results (not tabulated) show that cross-border non-high-tech related 
acquisitions and cross-border non-high-tech non-related acquisitions both earn significantly 
negative long run returns of -0.49%. 
Our long run results are consistent with the short run results of Morck and Yeung (1992) who 
find that acquirer announcement returns are positively correlated with firm level R&D 
expenditure. Our results are also consistent with the findings of Morck and Yeung (1991), and 
Morck and Yeung (2003) who show that firm level R&D is positively related to the value of 
multinational companies, but not domestic companies. 
(d)  Target country effects in cross-border acquisitions 
In this section we analyse calendar time returns in cross-border acquisitions by target country 
groupings based on trade differences, legal differences, cultural differences, and accounting 
differences. One explanation for the worse average outcome for cross-border acquisitions is the 
impact of these differences on UK acquirers. This is addressed in this section by examining the 
impact of the extent of these differences on merger outcomes. The results are reported in Table 8, 
for both public and private acquisitions, although the sample sizes for the former are often very 
small.28  
Insert Table 8 here 
Our analysis of announcement returns (not tabulated) show that they are zero for North and 
Central America, but positive for other continents, a result that holds for both public and private 
acquisitions.  For example, acquisitions in Europe, Australia and Oceania, and the rest of the 
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world result in announcement returns of 0.47%, 0.63% and 2.40% respectively. The first and last 
returns are statistically significant. The long run returns reported in Table 8 show that over the 
long run, acquisitions in North and Central America, Europe, and Australia and Oceania, result in 
zero abnormal returns. However, evidence of long run underperformance is found for the small 
number (30) of acquisitions in the rest of the world, which result in very large negative (although 
insignificant) returns of -0.8%. The long run returns to all continents in public acquisitions are 
large and negative although not significant, which given the small sample sizes is not surprising. 
This suggests that the market’s initial assessment of public acquisitions outside the US is overly 
optimistic, especially when compared with the more realistic announcement effect with US 
targets. 
To measure the impact of trade policy, government intervention and capital restrictions on 
returns we employ the Economic Freedom of the World index developed by Gwartney et al. 
(1996). We take the average country index scores over the years 1985, 1990, and 1995. The scale 
for our sample ranges from 3.2 (least free) for Brazil to 9.4 (most free) for Hong Kong, with a 
median of 7.6. We classify any country with a score of 7.6 or less as having low economic 
freedom, and any country with a score of more than 7.6 as having high economic freedom. The 
announcement returns to low economic freedom acquisitions is 0.90% (t-statistic 3.06), whilst the 
returns to high economic freedom countries is 0.12% and insignificant. Over the long run, the 
returns to acquisitions are an insignificant -0.06% and -0.27% in low and high economic freedom 
countries respectively. These results suggest that although the measure of economic freedom does 
have a negative impact on announcement returns it does not have a significant effect on long run 
returns. 
To examine the impact of the target country’s corporate governance system, we report returns 
according to whether the target country’s system is the English common law system, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
28 The results for announcement returns are not reported in this table for reasons of brevity. Whenever 
they are material to our findings, they are reported in the text. 
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Scandinavian civil law system, the Germanic civil law system or the French civil law system (La 
Porta et al., 2000). Acquisitions of targets from countries with the English, Scandinavian, 
Germanic, and French legal systems earn announcement returns of 0.18%, 0.74%, 0.35%, and 
0.59% respectively, with only the French return statistically significant. Long run calendar time 
returns for these countries are -0.07%, 0.64%, 0.35%, and -0.71% respectively, with only the 
French return once again being statistically significant. These results are not consistent with the 
arguments of La Porta et al. (2000), since there is no linear relation between returns and quality of 
investor protection. 
To measure the impact of the national cultural difference between the UK and the target’s 
country, we employ a composite index based on Hofstede’s (1991) numerical classifications of 
four national cultural dimensions.29 For each acquisition, we take the difference between the 
target country and the UK in each of the four cultural dimensions. Our composite index is the 
summation of these four differences,30 which ranges from a low of 22 for the US to a high of 194 
for Portugal, with a median of 94. We classify any country with a score of 94 or less as having 
low cultural differences, and any country with a score of more than 94 as having high cultural 
differences. The announcement returns associated with acquisitions in countries with low cultural 
differences are an insignificant 0.19%, whilst acquisitions with high cultural differences result in 
significantly positive returns of 0.76% (t-statistic 2.28). However, over the long run post-bid 
period, the former result in insignificant negative returns of -0.19%, whilst the latter result in 
significantly negative returns of -0.75%. The long run returns shown in Table 8 suggest that the 
initial ‘better the devil you don't know’ market expectation is not well founded, and is 
dramatically reversed over the long run. This is consistent with practitioner surveys, which report 
                                                           
29 The four dimensions are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individuality, and femininity. Power 
distance refers to the distribution of power within the organisational system. Uncertainty avoidance relates 
to a country’s level of intolerance for uncertainty.  Individualism measures the perception of an individual’s 
relationship with the rest of collectivity. Femininity refers to the primary goals and objectives that societies 
have for their progress. 
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that up to 90% of unsuccessful cross-border acquisitions experience major, unforeseen, 
difficulties due to cultural differences (Schoenberg, 2000; and UNCTAD, 1999).  
To examine the impact of the target country’s accounting standards on long run returns, we 
employ the categorisation of Bavishi (1993). The scale of this index for the countries in our 
sample ranges from a low of 36 for Portugal to a high of 83 for Sweden, with a median of 69. We 
classify any country with a score of 69 or less as having low accounting standards, and any 
country with a score of more than 69 as having high accounting standards. For acquisitions in low 
accounting standard countries, the announcement returns are 0.56%, significant at the 10% level, 
whilst for acquisitions in high accounting standard countries, the announcement returns are an 
insignificant 0.18%. Over the long run post-bid period, the returns to acquisitions in low 
accounting standard countries are an insignificantly negative -0.46%, whilst for acquisitions in 
high accounting standard countries, the returns are somewhat lower, being an insignificantly 
negative -0.18%. These results do not provide support for the argument that lower accounting 
standards result in significantly lower long run returns.  
(e) Other determinants of returns in cross-border acquisitions 
To test whether the 1986 US tax changes had a positive impact on acquirer returns, we 
examined returns to acquisitions of US companies both before and after the changes. The results, 
not tabulated, show that for US acquisitions completed during 1984-86, the announcement returns 
are an insignificantly negative -0.33%, whilst for US acquisitions completed during 1987-1998, 
returns are an insignificant 0.16%. Over the long run, calendar time returns for the former are an 
insignificant -0.31% compared to an insignificant -0.12% for the latter. These results provide 
little support for the argument that increased tax incentives are linked to returns in cross-border 
acquisitions. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
30 Hofstede’s classification has been widely used in the management literature, and has been found to 
influence many aspects of a firm’s organisation, systems, and financial performance (Schoenberg, 2000). 
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To test the risk diversification motive, we examined whether returns were negatively related to 
a diversification variable, defined as the five-year pre-acquisition correlation coefficient between 
the UK equity market index and the target country’s equity market index. We classified any 
country with a coefficient lower (higher) than the median correlation as having low (high) 
correlation. We found that low correlation countries experience announcement returns of 0.19%, 
whilst high correlation countries experience announcement returns of 0.44%, which is significant 
at the 10% level. The long run post-bid calendar returns for acquisitions in low correlation 
countries were an insignificant -0.28%, compared to an insignificant -0.18% in high correlation 
countries. These results provide no evidence that the correlation in bidder and target markets has 
a negative impact on either announcement or long run returns. 
To test whether the strength of sterling relative to the target country currency (at the time of 
the acquisition) has a positive effect on returns, we subtract the average exchange rate (units of 
target country currency per pound sterling) for the 1984-98 sample period from the exchange rate 
for the completion month, and divide this difference by the average exchange rate. As a result, 
positive (negative) values indicate that sterling is strong (weak) relative to the target currency. 
The results, not tabulated, show that for acquisitions in which sterling is strong, announcement 
period returns are an insignificantly positive 0.14%, and for acquisitions in which sterling is 
weak, returns are a significantly positive 0.40%. Over the long run post-bid period, a strong 
exchange rate results in insignificant calendar time returns of -0.23%, a weak exchange rate in 
insignificant returns of -0.19%. These results provide no support for the argument that the 
strength of sterling at acquisition has a positive impact on announcement or long run returns. 
(ii) Regression analysis 
Finally, we draw upon the insights from our univariate analysis to explore the combined effect 
of these factors on acquisition returns. We examine the determinants of both short run and long 
run bidder returns using multiple regression analysis. For the announcement period regressions 
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we employ standard ordinary least squares cross-sectional analysis. For the post-bid returns, we 
use a Fama-Macbeth time series of monthly cross-sections methodology that controls for the 
problem of cross-sectional dependence (Andrade et al., 2001). Specifically, we run a cross-
sectional regression for each calendar month of the sample period, where the dependent variable 
is the monthly abnormal return. Coefficient values are estimated using the average values of the 
monthly coefficients, and statistical significance is calculated using their standard deviation.31 In 
Table 9, we present the results of regressions for the samples of domestic public, domestic 
private, cross-border public, cross-border private, and all acquisitions. Panel A reports the 
announcement return regressions, whilst Panel B reports the post-bid return regressions. 
Our explanatory variables include the variables that the univariate tests above indicated to be 
of some importance and other control variables,32 and are as follows: 
Noncash = one if payment is noncash, zero if not 
Relative size = transaction value relative to acquirer size 
Relative size * noncash = interaction variable between noncash offers and relative size   
  equal to relative size if payment is noncash, zero if cash 
Value = one if acquirer’s MTBV ratio is in quintile one (lowest), zero if not 
Glamour = one if acquirer’s MTBV ratio is in quintile five (highest), zero if not  
High-tech = one if both acquirer’s and target’s industries are defined as high-tech by 
Butchart (1987) 
Subsidiary = one if target is subsidiary of another firm, zero if not 
Related = one if merging firms are in same 2-digit SIC, zero if not 
Acquirer size = market value in millions of sterling at time of merger announcement 
                                                           
31 We also estimated the same regression models using the standard cross-section methodology with the 
36-month BHAR as the dependent variable. The results were very similar and our conclusions unchanged 
by this alternative method. 
32 Previous studies have shown that returns in domestic acquisitions are positively associated with each 
of these characteristics. For subsidiary targets see Fuller et al. (2002), related acquisitions (Megginson et 
al., 2004), acquirer size (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000), and hostile acquisitions (Cosh and Guest, 2001).  
 32
Competed = one if more than one bidder for target, zero if not 
Hostile = one if acquisition is hostile, zero if friendly 
Culture = Composite index of cultural differences between UK and target countries, as 
            described in Section 6(i)(d), with larger values indicating increasing dissimilarity 
Private = one if target is privately held firm, zero if publicly traded 
Cross-border = one if target is non UK firm, zero if UK firm 
 
Insert Table 9 here 
The determinants of the announcement returns for domestic and cross-border, public and 
private, targets are reported in Panel A of Table 9. The findings for the whole sample in Column 
(5) indicate that announcement returns are positively influenced by noncash methods and private 
targets, and are negatively influenced by cross-border acquisitions.  These results confirm our 
earlier univariate findings.  No other variables are significant.   
If we examine domestic private acquisitions further in column (2) we see that the only 
significant coefficient is the positive noncash variable. The impact of acquisitions of subsidiaries 
and of companies in related industries is positive, but not statistically significant. The findings for 
cross-border acquisitions, as shown in columns (3) and (4), reveal nothing of significance for 
public or private targets.   
The Fama-Macbeth regressions for post-merger performance are shown in Panel B of Table 9. 
If we look first at column (5), which holds the results for the whole sample, several variables are 
significant.  One, private deals have positive influence on long run performance.  This result was 
noted previously in Table 4 and also in announcement returns. This result holds for the separate 
samples of domestic and cross-border acquisitions also.  Two, cross-border mergers have lower 
returns than those found in domestic mergers, although the significance is modest.  Three, 
noncash acquisitions have significantly lower long run returns than cash mergers. This latter 
result holds for all domestic but not cross-border samples.  Four, the coefficient for relative size 
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suggests that smaller targets may be more easily digested than larger targets, but this result only 
holds for domestic mergers.   The combination variable (for noncash and relative size) is positive 
and significant. Although larger relative size has a negative impact on long run returns on its own, 
it can serve to offset the potential damage to long run returns in noncash acquisitions. Again, the 
only broad group for which this does not hold is cross-border acquisitions. Finally, the coefficient 
for value acquirers is significantly negative for the entire sample but the result is driven by the 
cross-border private sample.    
For the domestic public sample reported in column (1), the coefficient on the noncash variable 
is significantly negative and the coefficient on the glamour variable is negative, significant at the 
10% level. The coefficient on the hostile dummy variable is significantly positive. For the 
domestic private sample reported in column (2), the coefficient for the noncash variable is 
significantly negative, but not as large as in column (1), whilst the glamour variable is again 
significantly positive.  
For the cross-border public sample reported in column (3) only one variable is significant - the 
glamour variable - and it is negatively related to long run performance.   The other control 
variables and the culture variable are insignificant.   However, for the cross-border private sample 
in column (4) three variables are significant: value, high-tech and culture.33  The latter two 
variables are interesting because they are hypothesised to be especially important in cross-border 
mergers.  The positive influence that firms (acquiring and target) in the same high-tech industry 
have on long run returns is supportive of the internalization hypothesis.  The negative cultural 
variable indicates that low cultural similarities between Britain and countries of target firms result 
in lower long run returns for UK acquirers. The significance of the high-tech and cultural 
variables also holds for the entire sample of cross-border acquisitions (results not tabulated).         
                                                           
33 For the cross-border regressions, we also included dummy variables for the target country’s legal 
system, and continuous variables for the bidder and target country stock market correlation coefficient, 
exchange rate strength, economic freedom index, and the accounting standards index as specified above. 
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The multivariate long run results are similar to the univariate long run results and the 
conclusions drawn are as follows. The significant difference between private and public 
acquisitions is robust after controlling for other explanatory variables. Glamour acquirers 
underperform in public acquisitions but not private acquisitions. Returns in domestic acquisitions 
of public targets are significantly lower when noncash is used rather than cash. There is no 
evidence of this in cross-border acquisitions. We find evidence in domestic acquisitions that 
relative size has a positive impact in noncash acquisitions, but no support for the more effective 
monitor theory for cross-border acquisitions. In all cross-border acquisitions, national culture 
differences have a significantly negative impact, whilst high-tech acquisitions have a significantly 
positive effect. There is weak evidence that cross-border acquisitions experience lower returns 
than domestic acquisitions, consistent with the evidence of Denis et al. (2002) who show that 
multinational firms operate at a value discount compared to domestic firms. 
Of the control variables, we find that in domestic acquisitions hostile deals perform better than 
friendly mergers. This is consistent with previous UK evidence, and the argument that hostile 
acquisitions are carried out for disciplinary motives (Cosh and Guest, 2001). Although the 
number of cross-border hostile deals is very small, there is no evidence of superior long run 
returns.34 We tentatively suggest that retention of target management is especially important in 
cross-border acquisitions, due to their local knowledge of the different cultural, legal and 
regulatory environment. The results also show that acquisitions of domestic public subsidiaries 
result in higher returns than acquisitions of domestic public non-subsidiaries.35 Although the 
result is weak and does not hold in cross-border public acquisitions, it provides some support for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
The coefficients for these variables were insignificant, consistent with the univariate analysis, and were 
consequently excluded from the regression.  
34 The calendar time returns in domestic hostile acquisitions are an insignificantly positive 0.30%, 
compared to a significantly negative -0.54% in domestic friendly acquisitions. The returns in cross-border 
hostile acquisitions are an insignificant negative -1.03%, compared to a significantly negative -0.70% in 
cross-border friendly acquisitions.  
35 The calendar time returns in domestic acquisitions of public subsidiaries are an insignificant 0.07%, 
compared to a significantly negative -0.55% in domestic acquisitions of public non-subsidiaries. 
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the theory that more concentrated ownership in the target results in higher acquirer returns 
because of factors such as the reduction of asymmetric information in security financed 
acquisitions.   Control variables that did not prove to be significant in explaining long run returns 
were relatedness, acquirer size, and competed bids.    
7. Conclusions 
We examine the announcement and three-year post-acquisition performance of a sample of 
over 4,000 acquisitions by UK public firms occurring during 1984-1998. We include acquisitions 
of both domestic and cross-border targets, and acquisitions of both publicly quoted and privately 
held targets. This comprehensive sample allows each acquisition type to be directly contrasted 
with one another, and permits us to reach conclusions on the long run wealth effects of all 
acquisitions made by public acquirers. We hypothesise that bidder returns in private acquisitions 
will be higher than in public deals because of three factors: (i) improved due diligence and 
monitoring by target shareholders; (ii) lack of hubris effects in the bid process; and (iii), the 
presence of the private company discount in the relatively illiquid market for private firms. We 
further argue that the relative returns to bidders in overseas, compared to domestic, acquisitions 
will depend upon the extent to which the gains from internalising synergies from information 
based assets via geographical diversification are offset by problems of post-merger integration 
due to cultural dissonance.  
Acquisitions of domestic public targets result in significantly negative announcement returns. 
Acquisitions of cross-border public targets result in zero announcement returns. In contrast, 
acquisitions of private targets result in significantly positive announcement returns in both cross-
border and in domestic acquisitions. For all public acquisitions, returns are significantly negative, 
but are significantly positive in all private acquisitions. The returns to all domestic and all cross-
border acquisitions are dominated by the private acquisitions and are significantly positive. The 
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abnormal returns for the 36 months post-merger are significantly negative for both domestic and 
cross-border public targets. Acquisitions of private targets result in insignificant negative long run 
returns for both domestic and cross-border acquisitions. Acquisitions of all domestic companies, 
which include both public and private targets, exhibit insignificant long run returns.   
Announcement and long run returns in cross-border acquisitions are lower than in domestic 
acquisitions. 
We find that cash dominates cross-border and private domestic acquisitions. The 
announcement returns show that cash deals are worse than noncash and public targets give lower 
announcement returns than private acquisitions. The one exception is for domestic public targets, 
for which the significantly negative announcement returns experienced by noncash acquirers is 
lower than the zero announcement returns experienced by cash acquirers. The main difference 
between domestic private and public acquisitions is the worse performance of public targets in 
noncash acquisitions. Our evidence is consistent with the theory that acquirers offer securities to 
acquire domestic public targets when the acquirer is overvalued, but in acquisitions of private 
targets this problem is mitigated because acquirers can disclose private information to the more 
concentrated target shareholders.  
The poor performance of public acquisitions is limited to those made by glamour acquirers, 
whilst in contrast, glamour acquirers in private acquisitions do not underperform. The lack of 
publicity surrounding private acquisitions may decrease the likelihood of hubris-motivated 
takeovers, since acquirers are better able to break off negotiations when it becomes strategic to do 
so. However, we would still expect to find glamour acquirers performing worse than other 
acquirers. Instead, we find that in private acquisitions, it is only value acquirers that experience 
negative long run returns.  
Strong support is found in the long run for the internalization motive for cross-border 
acquisitions. Cross-border private high-tech acquisitions result in significantly positive 
announcement and long run returns, whilst non-high-tech acquisitions result in significantly 
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negative returns. Our conclusion is that technological know-how is critical in the long run success 
of direct foreign investment through acquisition. Similarly, long run returns are low when cultural 
differences are greater between the UK and countries of targets.  No support was found for other 
common explanations for cross-border mergers related to differences in legal systems, accounting 
standards, economic freedoms, taxes, or exchange rates.   
The multivariate results are similar to the univariate results. The significant difference between 
private and public acquisitions is robust after controlling for other explanatory variables. Glamour 
acquirers underperform in public acquisitions but not private acquisitions. Returns in domestic 
acquisitions of public targets (and to a lesser degree for private targets) are significantly lower 
when noncash is used rather than cash. There is no evidence of this in cross-border acquisitions. 
We find evidence in domestic acquisitions that relative size has a positive impact in noncash 
acquisitions, but no support for the more effective monitor theory for cross-border acquisitions. In 
all cross-border acquisitions, national culture differences have a significantly negative impact, 
whilst high-tech acquisitions have a significantly positive effect. There is weak evidence that 
cross-border acquisitions experience lower returns than domestic acquisitions. 
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Figure 1 
The Number and Value of Domestic and Cross-Border Acquisitions by UK Acquirers, 1969-2001 
 
Panel A: Number of Domestic and Cross-Border Acquisitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Value of Domestic and Cross-Border Acquisitions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Panel A reports the total number of acquisitions made by UK acquiring companies (public and private) of domestic targets and cross-
border targets (public and private). Panel B reports the total value of acquisitions made by UK acquiring companies (public and 
private) of domestic targets and cross-border targets (public and private). The values used are expressed in 2000 sterling values 
(billions), deflated using the FT All Share index.  
 
Source: 
UK Office for National Statistics.  
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Table 1 
Summary of the Long Run Event Studies of Acquisitions of Cross-Border Targets and Private Targets 
Study Domestic or Cross-
Border  
Public or Private  Bidder 
Country 
Target 
Country 
Period Sample 
Size 
Methodology Share Returns 
(%) 
Length of Event 
Period (Months) 
Conn and Connell  
(1990) 
Cross-border Public     US UK 1971-80 35  Market model CARs -11.5 b 12 
 Cross-border Public     UK US 1971-80 38  
 
Market model CARs 
 
-22.6 b 12 
Danbolt  
(1995) 
Cross-border Public     Non UK  UK 1986-91 50 Market model CARs -9.8 a 
 
5 
Eckbo and Thorburn 
(2000) 
 
Cross-border Public and private US  Canada 1964-83 394  
 
Market model CARs 
 
-3.7  12 
Ang and Kohers  
(2001) 
Domestic Private US US 1984-96 7,070 Fama-French three-factor 
model monthly intercept 
0.8  36 
Black et al. (2003) 
 
Cross-border Public US Non-US  1985-95 361  Size/ market-to-book  / prior 
return portfolio BHARs  
-22.9 a 
  
60 
 
Aw and Chatterjee  
(2004) 
 
Cross-border Public  UK Non-UK   1991-96 41 Market model CARs 
 
-24.4 a  
 
24 
 
Gregory and 
McCorriston (2004) 
Cross-border Public and private UK Non-UK  1985-94 333  Size / market-to-book    
portfolio BHARs 
-9.3   60 
Moeller et al. (2004) Domestic Private US US 1980-
2001 
5,583 Fama-French three-factor 
model monthly intercept 
 
0.03 
 
36 
 
 
Notes: 
This table reports the results of previous long run event studies that have examined acquisitions of cross-border targets, and acquisitions of private targets. a, b, c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels. 
 
Table 2  
Sample Statistics 
 
Domestic 
Public  
Domestic 
Private  
Cross-Border 
Public  
Cross-Border 
Private  
Number of Acquisitions 576 2,628 131 1,009 
Number of Acquirers 403 1,146 109 539 
Mean Number of Acquisitions by each Acquirer 5 5  5  5  
Mean Size Quintile of Acquirer 3.6  2.6  4.4  3.6  
Mean Market-to-book Ratio Quintile of Acquirer  3.0  2.8  3.2  3.2  
Mean Size of Acquirer (£ Sterling Millions) 1,055  258  2,879  1,004  
Median Size of Acquirer (£ Sterling Millions) 211  52 1,008 192 
Mean Transaction Value (£ Sterling Millions) 376  49  923 169  
Median Transaction Value (£ Sterling Millions) 62 10  266 28 
Mean Relative Size (Transaction Value to Acquirer)  0.55  0.31  0.39  0.23  
Median Relative Size (Transaction Value to Acquirer)   0.29  0.13 0.15  0.11 
 % of Acquisitions 
Time Period     
1984-89  54 32 51 34 
1990-98 46 68 49 66 
Method of Payment     
All Cash  13 54 80 72 
All Stock  24 10 8 5 
Stock and Cash  50 28 5 15 
Other   11 8 7 8 
High-Tech Bidders 21 19 27 30 
High-Tech Targets 23 18 36 34 
Both High-Tech 8 10 19 21 
Hostile Acquisitions 13 0 10 0 
Related Acquisitions  22 43 35 46 
Subsidiary Targets  24 32 8 39 
Competed Acquisitions 6.4 0.4 9.9 0.5 
Continent of Target for Cross-Border Acquisitions     
  Australia and Oceania a   8.5 4.0 
  Africa b   0.8 0.4 
  Asia c   1.5 0.3 
  Eastern Asia d   0.8 1.5 
  Europe e   17.1 42.8 
  Former USSR f   0.0 0.1 
  North  and Central America g   71.3 50.6 
  South America h   0.0 0.3 
Notes: 
This table reports summary statistics for a sample of domestic and cross-border acquisitions made by UK public firms between 
January 1984 and December 1998, where the acquirer was included on the Datastream Database, and where size and market-to-book 
ratios were available for the end of the last calendar year prior to the year of announcement. Includes only transactions where 
acquisition value was at least 5% of acquirer market value at announcement. Market-to-book ratio and size quintiles are calculated by 
ranking all Datastream firms by market-to-book ratio (or size) at the beginning of each year and taking five groups of equal size in 
terms of number. Acquirers in quintile one have the lowest market-to-book ratio (or size). Transaction values in foreign currencies 
were converted to sterling using the exchange rate at the end of the announcement month. The values used are expressed in 2000 
sterling values (millions), deflated using the FT All Share index. There are 89 sample acquisitions for which the method of payment is 
unknown. High-tech companies are those, whose primary SIC code is defined as high-tech by Butchart (1987).  Butchart (1987) 
defines UK industries as high-tech if the R&D expenditure to industry output is substantially above average. If this ratio is above - but 
not substantially above - average, a second measure is employed based on the proportion of scientists, professional engineers and 
technicians in the labour force. Related acquisitions are defined as those in which the acquirer and target share the same primary 2-
digit SIC code. Subsidiary targets are defined as those in which the target is majority owned by another company. a Australia (9, 35), 
New Zealand (2, 5). b South Africa (1, 4). c India (2, 0), Pakistan (0, 1), Sri Lanka (0, 2). d Burma (0, 1), China (0, 2), Hong Kong (0, 
7), Japan (1, 0), Malaysia (0, 3), Singapore (0, 2). e Austria (0, 2), Belgium (1, 24), Czech Republic (0, 1), Denmark (0, 16), Eire (1, 
12), Finland (1, 3), France (6, 113), Germany (3, 78), Greece (0, 1), Hungary (0, 1), Iceland (0, 1), Italy (0, 23), Luxembourg (0, 4), 
Netherlands (4, 77), Norway (2, 7), Portugal (0, 3), Spain (1, 27), Sweden (4, 24), Switzerland (1,12). g Bermuda (0, 3), Canada (6, 
36), Cayman Islands (0, 1), Mexico (0, 4), Panama (0, 1), United States (86, 464). h Brazil (0, 1), Chile (0, 1), Venezuela (0, 1). There 
are five sample cross-border acquisitions for which the target country is unknown. 
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Table 3 
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns 
 
 Public Private All 
    
Domestic -0.99 
a 1.05 a 0.68 a 
 
(-4.00, 575) (8.70, 2,611) (6.23, 3,186) 
 
   
Cross-Border -0.09 0.38 
b 0.33 b 
 
(-0.19, 130) (2.17, 1,004) (1.99, 1,134) 
 
   
All -0.82 
a 0.86 a 0.59 a 
 
(-3.74, 705) (8.64, 3,615) (6.43, 4,320) 
    Notes: 
This table reports the mean cumulative abnormal share return (CAR) for acquirers calculated over the announcement period, which is 
calculated from day -1 to day +1, where day 0 is the announcement day. The abnormal return is calculated relative to the Market 
Index. Figures in parentheses are the t-statistic and number of acquisitions. a, b, c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 4  
Post-bid Abnormal Returns Using Buy-and-Hold Returns and Calendar Time Returns 
 Public Private All 
Panel A: Buy-and-hold Abnormal Returns 
    
Domestic -19.78 a  -4.78  -7.47  
 (-2.73, 576) (-0.75, 2,628) (-1.22, 3,204) 
    
Cross-Border -32.33 b -10.91  -13.37 c 
 (-2.51, 131) (-1.42, 1,009) (-1.80, 1,140) 
    
All -22.11 a -6.48  -9.02  
 (-3.14, 707) (-1.03, 3,637) (-1.47, 4,344) 
    
Panel B: Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
    
Domestic -0.40 b -0.08 -0.19 
 (-1.97, 576) (-0.55, 2,628) (-1.38, 3,204) 
    
Cross-Border -0.71 b -0.19 -0.27 
 (-2.17, 131) (-1.20, 1,009) (-1.63, 1,140) 
    
All -0.42 b -0.14 -0.21 
 (-2.10, 707) (-1.06, 3,637) (-1.58, 4,344) 
    
Notes: 
Panel A reports mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for acquirers over the 36 months following the completion month, 
computed with respect to control firms matched on size and market-to-book ratio. The t-statistics are adjusted for cross-sectional 
dependence in an identical way to Mitchell and Stafford (2000) as described in the text. Panel B reports mean calendar time abnormal 
share returns (CTAR) calculated using the acquirer’s 36-month post-bid abnormal returns, with reference to control firms matched on 
size and market-to-book ratio. Calendar months with less than five observations have been excluded from the analysis. Figures in 
parentheses are the t-statistic and number of acquisitions. a, b, c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 5 
Announcement Period and Post-Bid Abnormal Returns by Method of Payment 
Domestic / Cross-Border All Cash / Noncash Public Private All 
Panel A: Announcement Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Domestic  All Cash 0.43 0.72 a 0.71 a 
 
 (0.72, 75) (4.98, 1,390) (5.02, 1,465) 
 
    
 Noncash -1.19 a 1.41 a 0.63 a 
 
 (-4.40, 500) (6.92, 1,165) (3.77, 1,665) 
 
    
Cross-Border All Cash -0.19 0.27 0.21 
 
 (-0.37, 105) (1.34, 703) (1.12, 808) 
 
 
   
 Noncash 0.24 0.66 c 0.62 c 
 
 (0.20, 25) (1.76, 268) (1.74, 293) 
 
    
All All Cash 0.07 0.57 a 0.53 a 
 
 (0.17, 180) (4.83, 2,093) (4.70, 2,273) 
 
 
   
 Noncash -1.12 a 1.27 a 0.63 a 
 
 (-4.25, 525) (7.05, 1,433) (4.15, 1,958) 
 
    
Panel B: Post-bid Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
 
    
Domestic  All Cash 0.06 -0.14 -0.13 
 
 (0.19, 75) (-0.77, 1,400) (-0.80, 1,475) 
 
 
   
 Noncash -0.47 b -0.07 -0.22 
 
 (-1.97, 501) (-0.35, 1,172) (-1.26, 1,673) 
 
    
Cross-Border All Cash -0.59 c -0.19 -0.31 
 
 (-1.65, 105) (-0.79, 706) (-1.29, 811) 
 
 
   
 Noncash -0.51 -0.32 -0.21 
 
 (-0.92, 26) (-1.20, 270) (-0.80, 296) 
 
    
All All Cash -0.28 -0.23 -0.25 
 
 (-1.03, 180) (-1.452,106) (-1.61, 2,286) 
 
    
 Noncash -0.40 c -0.08 -0.19 
 
 (-1.73, 427) (-0.43, 1,442) (-1.18, 1,969) 
 
 
   Notes: 
Panel A reports the mean cumulative abnormal share return (CAR) for acquirers over the announcement period, which is calculated 
from day -1 to day +1, where day 0 is the announcement day. The abnormal return is calculated relative to the Market Index. Panel B 
reports mean calendar time abnormal share returns (CTAR) calculated using the acquirer’s 36-month post-bid abnormal returns, with 
respect to control firms matched on size and market-to-book ratio. Calendar months with less than five observations have been 
excluded from the analysis, except for cross-border public noncash acquisitions, for which all available months were included. In 
Panels A and B, acquisitions are classified according to the payment method used, categorised as all cash offers, or any other type of 
offer. The payment method is unknown for 89 acquisitions. Figures in parentheses are the t-statistic and number of acquisitions. a, b, c 
refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 6  
Announcement Period and Post-Bid Abnormal Returns by Acquirer MTBV 
Domestic/ Cross-Border MTBV Public Private  All 
Panel A: Announcement Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Domestic Value 
-0.77 1.35 a 0.99 a 
 
 (-0.93, 87) (3.60, 430) (2.99, 517) 
 
 Neutral -0.76 a 1.04 a 0.72 a 
 
 (-2.66, 359) (7.15, 1,641) (5.49, 2,000) 
 Glamour -1.73 a 0.80 a 0.31 
 
 (-3.26, 129) (3.48, 540) (1.45, 669) 
Cross-Border Value -0.84 -0.25 -0.33 
 
 (-0.60, 19) (-0.39, 120) (-0.57, 139) 
 Neutral 0.01 0.34 0.30 
 
 (0.03, 75) (1.55, 613) (1.50, 688) 
 Glamour 0.03 0.74 b 0.65 b 
 
 (0.02, 36) (2.31, 271) (2.10, 307) 
 All Value -0.78 1.00 a 0.71 b 
 
 (-0.79, 106) (3.07, 550) (2.39, 656) 
 
 Neutral -0.63 b 0.85 a  0.61 
 
 (-2.49, 434) (6.99, 2,254)  (5.55, 2,688) 
 Glamour -1.35 a 0.78 a 0.42 b 
 
 (-2.76, 165) (4.18, 811) (2.37, 976) 
Panel B: Post-bid Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
Domestic Value -0.60 -0.74 b -0.71 b 
 
 
(-1.15, 87) (-2.13, 433) (-2.43, 520) 
 Neutral -0.31 -0.07 -0.21 
 
 
(-1.46, 359) (-0.44, 1,651) (-1.43, 2,010) 
 
 Glamour -0.84 b 0.14 -0.04 
 
 
(-2.00, 130) (0.41, 544) (-0.17, 674) 
 Cross-Border Value 0.62 -1.31 b -1.27 b 
 
 
(0.40, 19) (-2.21, 120) (-2.13, 139) 
 Neutral 0.15 -0.04 -0.03 
 
 
(0.39, 75) (-0.18, 615) (-0.13, 690) 
 Glamour -1.48 b 0.29 -0.14 
 
 
(-2.20, 47) (1.07, 274) (-0.44, 321) 
 All Value -0.50 -0.85 a -0.94 a 
 
 
(-0.98, 106) (-2.76, 553) (-3.31, 659) 
 Neutral -0.24 -0.12 -0.16 
 
 
(-1.19, 434) (-0.85, 2,266) (-1.18, 2,700) 
 Glamour -0.91 b 0.12 -0.16 
  (-2.54, 167) (0.39, 818) (-0.60, 985) 
Notes:  
Panel A reports the mean cumulative abnormal share return (CAR) for acquirers over the announcement period, which is calculated 
from day -1 to day +1, where day 0 is the announcement day. The abnormal return is calculated relative to the Market Index. Panel B 
reports mean calendar time abnormal share returns (CTAR) calculated using the acquirer’s 36-month post-bid abnormal returns, with 
respect to control firms matched on size and market-to-book ratio. Calendar months with less than five observations have been 
excluded from the analysis. In Panels A and B, acquirers are categorised as value, neutral or glamour depending on their market-to-
book (MTBV) quintile at the beginning of the year of acquisition. Market-to-book ratio quintiles are calculated by ranking all 
Datastream firms by market-to-book ratios at the beginning of each year and taking five groups equal sized in terms of number. 
Acquirers in quintile one (lowest market-to-book ratio) are defined as value, acquirers in quintiles 2-4 are defined as neutral, and 
acquirers in quintile five are defined as glamour. Figures in parentheses are the t-statistic and number of acquisitions. a, b, c refers to 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 7 
Announcement Period and Post-Bid Abnormal Returns by High-Tech Status 
Domestic / Cross-Border High-Tech / Non-High-Tech Public Private All 
Panel A: Announcement Period Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Domestic  High-Tech -2.34 a 1.33 a 0.61 b 
  
(-4.62, 119) (3.78, 485) (1.99, 604) 
  
  
 
 Non-High-Tech -0.63 a 0.98 a 0.69 a 
  
(-2.22, 456) (7.88, 2,126) (6.08, 2,582) 
  
  
 Cross-Border  High-Tech -0.11 1.02 a 0.90 a 
  
(-0.12, 35) (2.90, 303) (2.72, 338) 
  
  
 
 Non-High-Tech -0.11 0.10 0.07 
  
(-0.20, 95) (0.49, 701) (0.39, 796) 
  
  
 All  High-Tech -1.83 a 1.21 a 0.71 a 
  
(4.02, 154) (4.75, 788) (3.12, 942) 
  
  
 
 Non-High-Tech -0.54 b 0.76 a 0.55 a 
  
(-2.13, 551) (7.17, 2,827) (5.60, 3,378) 
  
  
 Panel B: Post-bid Calendar Time Abnormal Returns 
  
  
 Domestic  High-Tech -1.45 b -0.21 -0.43 
  
(-2.02, 48) (-0.60, 197) (-1.42, 308) 
  
  
 
 Non-High-Tech -0.31 0.01 -0.15 
  
(-1.54, 528) (0.08, 2,368) (-1.04, 2,896) 
  
  
 Cross-Border  High-Tech -0.59 0.82 b 0.64 c 
  
(-0.80, 25) (2.18, 208) (1.76, 233) 
  
  
 
 Non-High-Tech -0.61 c -0.44 b -0.52 a 
  
(-1.77, 106) (-2.07, 801) (-2.60, 907) 
  
  
 All  High-Tech -1.10 a 0.09 -0.11 
  
(-2.68, 73) (0.28, 468) (-0.40, 541) 
     
 Non-High-Tech -0.39 c -0.16 -0.23 
  
(-1.90, 634) (-1.08, 3,169) (-1.62, 3,803) 
  
  
 Notes: 
Panel A reports the mean cumulative abnormal share return (CAR) for acquirers over the announcement period, which is calculated 
from day -1 to day +1, where day 0 is the announcement day. The abnormal return is calculated relative to the Market Index. Panel B 
reports mean calendar time abnormal share returns (CTAR) calculated using the acquirer’s 36-month post-bid abnormal returns, with 
respect to control firms matched on size and market-to-book ratio. Calendar months with less than five observations have been 
excluded from the analysis. In Panels A and B, acquisitions are classified according to whether the acquirer’s and target firm’s primary 
industries are both defined as high-tech, according to Butchart (1987). Butchart (1987) defines UK industries as high-tech if the R&D 
expenditure to industry output is substantially above average. If this ratio is above - but not substantially above - average, a second 
measure is employed based on the proportion of scientists, professional engineers and technicians in the labour force. Figures in 
parentheses are the t-statistic and number of acquisitions. a, b, c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
Table 8 
Post-Bid Abnormal Returns by Target Country Characteristics 
Target Country Groupings  Public Private All 
     Continent Australia and Oceania  -0.61 -0.12 0.24 
  (-0.70, 11) (-0.17, 40) (0.45, 51) 
     
 Europe   -0.61 -0.17 -0.04 
  (-0.90, 24) (-0.62, 430) (-0.15, 454) 
     
 North  and Central America  -0.54 -0.17 -0.11 
  (-1.24, 92) (-0.56, 508) (-0.51, 600) 
     
 Other Continents -1.54 -0.47 -0.8 
  (-0.87, 4) (-0.54. 26) (-1.04, 30,) 
   
  
Economic Freedom Low  -0.55 0.38 -0.06 
  (-0.76, 18) (0.85, 236) (-0.20, 255) 
     
 High  -0.43 -0.29 -0.27 
  (-1.07, 113) (-1.09, 744) (-1.15, 857) 
   
  
Legal System  English Common Law -0.56 -0.14 -0.07 
  (-1.33, 107) (-0.45, 573) (-0.34, 680) 
     
 Scandinavian Civil Law -1.57 0.53 0.64 
  (-1.44, 7) (0.68, 50) (1.03, 57) 
     
 German Civil Law -0.91 0.39 0.35 
  (-0.44, 5) (0.81, 92) (0.90, 97) 
     
 French Civil Law 0.31 -0.55 -0.71 b 
  (0.40, 12) (-1.54, 280) (-2.36, 292) 
   
  
Cultural Differences  Low -0.48 -0.21 -0.19 
  (-1.26, 103) (-0.79, 789) (-0.87, 907) 
     
 High -0.59 -0.69 c -0.75 b 
  (-0.70, 11) (-1.91, 190) (-2.15, 201) 
     
Accounting Standards Low -0.91 -0.31 -0.46 
  (-0.99, 11) (-0.77, 258) (-1.50, 269) 
     
 High -0.51 -0.22 -0.18 
  (-1.49, 118) (-0.71, 715) (-0.80, 833) 
Notes: 
This table reports mean calendar time abnormal share returns (CTAR) calculated using the acquirer’s 36-month post-bid abnormal 
returns, with respect to control firms matched on size and market-to-book ratio. Calendar months with less than five observations have 
been excluded from the analysis, except for the public acquisitions for which all monthly observations are included. ‘Other continents’ 
include Africa, Asia, East Asia, South America, and the former USS.R. Economic freedom is measured using the method of 
Gwartney, et al. (1996). The scale of this index ranges from 3.2 (least free) for Brazil to 9.4 (most free) for Hong Kong, with a median 
of 7.6. We classify any country with a score of 7.6 or less as having low economic freedom, and any country with a score of more than 
7.6 as having high economic freedom. The legal system of the target country is categorised according to LaPorta et al. (2000). The 
cultural difference measurement is a composite index for cultural difference, formed using the sum of the deviations along four 
cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1991) of the acquired firm country from the UK, with larger values signifying increasing dissimilarity. 
The sum of these differences ranges from a low of 22 for the US to a high of 194 for Portugal, with a median of 94. We classify any 
country with a score of 94 or less as having low cultural differences, and any country with a score of more than 94 as having high 
cultural differences. Accounting standards are measured according to the index used by Bavishi (1993). The scale of this index for the 
countries in our sample ranges from a low of 36 for Portugal to a high of 83 for Sweden, with a median of 69. We classify any country 
with a score of 69 or less as having low accounting standards, and any country with a score of more than 69 as having high accounting 
standards. Figures in parentheses are the t-statistic and number of acquisitions. a, b, c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 9 
Panel A: Regressions of Announcement Period Abnormal Returns 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Domestic  
Public 
Domestic  
Private 
Cross-Border  
Public 
Cross-Border  
Private 
All 
Intercept 0.57 0.44 c -0.96 -0.21 -1.17 a 
 (0.70) (1.74) (-0.88) (-0.49) (-3.77) 
     Noncash 
-1.15 0.72 b -0.10 0.10 0.59 b 
 (-1.23) (2.23) (-0.05) (0.19) (2.40) 
     Relative Size 
-0.34 -0.08 -0.77 -0.57 -0.04 
 (-0.45) (-0.40) (-0.88) (-1.31) (-0.27) 
     Relative Size * Noncash 
-1.52 0.44 0.78 1.02 -0.62 
 (-0.82) (0.49) (0.22) (0.63) (-0.96) 
     Value 0.04 0.32 0.06 -0.31 0.14 
 (0.06) (0.96) (0.04) (-0.55) (0.55) 
     Glamour 
-0.70 -0.31 -0.12 0.51 -0.18 
 (-1.15) (-0.99) (-0.10) (1.22) (-0.78) 
     High-Tech 
-0.76 0.44 0.79 0.70 0.40 
 (-0.84) (1.08) (0.61) (1.55) (1.44) 
     Subsidiary 0.73 0.34 1.52 0.31 0.29 
 (1.24) (1.23) (0.81) (0.81) (1.45) 
     Related  1.01 0.21 -0.15 -0.23 0.18 
 (1.62) (0.86) (-0.14) (-0.63) (0.95) 
     Acquirer Size  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.44) (0.34) (1.21) (0.24) (1.01) 
     Competed  
-0.30 0.32 0.38 -0.50 -0.23 
 (-0.30) (0.16) (0.23) (-0.20) (-0.31) 
     Hostile  
-0.12 - 0.15 - - 
 (-0.15) - (0.08) - - 
     Culture  
- 
- 0.01 0.01 - 
 
- 
- (0.00) (1.35) - 
 -    Private 
- 
- - - 1.75 a 
 
- 
- - - (6.49) 
     Cross-Border 
- 
- - - 
-0.47 b 
 
- 
- - - (-2.17) 
Number of Acquisitions 565 2,603 127 972 4,307 
Adjusted R2 1.67 0.18 -5.33 -0.16 1.26 
Notes: 
Panel A reports results from cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions, where the dependent variable is the cumulative 
abnormal share return (CAR) for acquirers over the announcement period as defined in Table 3. Noncash is a dummy variable which 
equals one if the method of payment is not an all cash only offer, zero if all cash only. Relative size is the transaction value relative to 
the acquirer size. Relative size * noncash is equal to the relative size if the method of payment is noncash, zero if all cash only. Value 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio quintile is quintile one (lowest), zero otherwise. Glamour is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer’s market-to-book ratio quintile is quintile five (highest), zero otherwise. High-tech is a 
dummy which equals one if the bidder and target’s primary SIC codes are both defined as high-tech, according to Butchart (1987), 
zero if not. Subsidiary is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is majority owned by another company, zero otherwise. Related is 
a dummy variable, which equals one if the bidder and target share the same primary 2-digit SIC. Acquirer size is the market valuation 
in millions of the acquirer at the acquisition announcement. Competed is a dummy variable equal to one if there is more than one 
bidder for the target company, zero if not. Hostile is a dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is hostile, zero if friendly. 
Culture is a composite index for cultural difference, formed using the sum of the deviations along four cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 
1991) of the acquired firm country from the UK, with larger values signifying increasing dissimilarity. Private is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the target is a private company, zero if public. Cross-border is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is a cross-
border company, zero if domestic. Figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. a, b, c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 9 
Panel B: Fama-Macbeth Regressions of Post-Bid Abnormal Returns 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Domestic  
Public 
Domestic  
Private 
Cross-Border  
Public 
Cross-Border  
Private 
All 
Intercept 0.44 -0.06 6.17 0.51 -0.42 
 (0.85) (-0.27) (1.49) (1.68) (-1.46) 
Noncash -1.57 b -0.52 b 1.28 0.01 -0.43 b 
 (-2.44) (-2.02) (0.87) (0.02) (-2.06) 
Relative Size -0.36 -0.91 b 1.30 0.65 -0.50 c 
 (-0.40) (-2.55) (0.38) (1.16) (-1.78) 
Relative Size * Noncash 2.09 2.09 a -9.66 -2.24 1.72 b 
 (1.18) (2.75) (-1.57) (-1.02) (2.29) 
Value -0.55 -0.52 -11.91 -0.92 c -0.81 a 
 (-0.98) (-1.41) (-0.21) (-1.94) (-2.77) 
Glamour -0.72 c 0.72 b -1.91 b -0.26 0.01 
 (-1.93) (2.44) (-2.01) (-0.83) (0.06) 
High-tech -0.33 -0.05 0.33 0.77 b 0.21 
 (-0.58) (-0.17) (0.30) (2.26) (0.87) 
Subsidiary 0.57 -0.01 -1.61 -0.31 0.11 
 (1.06) (-0.05) (-0.77) (-1.15) (0.85) 
Related  -0.03 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.07 
 (-0.10) (0.74) (0.16) (0.29) (0.49) 
Acquirer Size  0.00 0.00 -0.19 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.94) (-0.99) (-0.12) (1.23) (-0.21) 
Competed -0.70 -0.53 1.38 -0.18 0.11 
 (-1.24) (-0.33) (0.99) (-0.13) (0.23) 
Hostile  1.06 b - 0.00 - - 
 (2.35) - (-0.02) - - 
Culture  - - -0.15 -0.01 a - 
 - - (-1.60) (-2.76) - 
Private - - - - 0.62 a 
 - - - - (2.81) 
Cross-Border - - - - -0.30 c 
 - - - - (-1.93) 
Number of Acquisitions 576 2,628 129 979 4,344 
Number of Monthly Obs. 174 184 122 174 197 
Average Adjusted R2 1.40 1.06 0.46 2.42 0.68 
Notes: 
Panel B reports results from a series of cross sectional ordinary least squares regressions that are estimated for each month of the 
sample period, where the dependent variable is the post-bid monthly abnormal return calculated with respect to control firms matched 
on size and market-to-book ratios. The reported coefficients are the averages for all months, and their significance calculated using the 
monthly standard deviation. Monthly coefficients are winsorized at the 1% level. The reported adjusted R2 are the averages from the 
monthly regressions. Months including less than 50 observations are excluded from the analysis, except for model (3) for which the 
small sample size dictates only months including less than 15 observations are excluded from the analysis. Explanatory variables are 
as defined in Panel A. Figures in parentheses are the t-statistics. a, b, c refers to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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